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Implementing Behavioral Concepts into Banking Theory: The Impact of Loss
Aversion on Collateralization
Thomas Langer
Peter Waller1
In standard bank theoretic models agents are assumed to be fully rational expected
utility maximizers. This fact ignores the huge amount of evidence for anomalies in
human behavior found by psychologists. In this paper we argue that the
implementation of behavioral concepts into banking theory might increase the
predictive power of  the models. As an example we consider a loan market and
discuss the impact of loss aversion on the degree of collateralization in equilibrium.
The very well established concept loss aversion predicts entrepreneurs to pay much
more attention to the potential loss of some of their initial wealth due to a
collateralized loan than they would do as expected utility maximizers. This results
in a higher effort choice which in turn increases the success probability of the loan
financed project. Optimal levels of collateralization are derived for different
degrees of loss aversion and the problem of private information about the degree of
loss aversion is addressed. It is shown that in specific situations banks can offer self
selecting pairs of contracts that costlessly eliminate the private information
problem.  
1. Introduction and Motivation 
Human nature is complex in its motivations, beliefs and behavior. While psychologic research
explores this richness, economists have a quite simplified view of humans in their models.
Following expected utility theory (EUT), even in descriptive models they generally assume a
rational behaving individual which maximizes his stable, well-defin d preferences. This is done
in contrast to the variety of anomalies in human behavior identified by psychologists. Examples
include framing effects, fairness considerations, representativeness heuristics, as well as
Rabin (1996) gives a comprehensive overview.2
Cf. Kahneman/Tversky (1979), Tversky/Kahneman (1992).3
Cf.  Thaler (1986) for a more comprehensive list of arguments.4
Cf. Thaler (1986).5
Arrow (1982)6
Cf. DeBondt/Thaler (1985,1987,1990), Schiereck/Weber (1995), Stein (1989)7
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aversion to losses and to ambiguity. These deviations are too extreme and too widespread to be2
reconciled within EUT or another normative model of rational choice. Descriptive theories, such
as Prospect Theory, were developed to account much better for these anomalies.3
Economists justify the use of a normative analysis to explain and to predict actual behavior by
different arguments. First, departures from rationality and self interest are said to be eliminated4
by competitive markets as other market participants will take advantage of arbitrage possibilities
resulting from these deviations. Even without an arbitrage mechanism, many economists believe
that individual irrationalities will disappear in the aggregate. 
We raise objections against this argument. Beside the fact that much economic activity is not
mediated by fully competitive markets it is to doubt whether markets will always drive
irrationalities to disappear. Russell and Thaler (1985) showed in a simple model that the market-
reduces-irrationalities hypothesis only holds when specific conditions are sat sfied. In fact, there
must be a possibility to shortsell goods or to trade the goods* c aracteristics ndependent from
the goods themselves. They draw the conclusion that "these conditions are quite restrictive and
are unlikely to occur in any but the most efficient financial markets".  Similar results were found5
in a theoretical study by Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985). Markets may well exist in which
both rational and irrational individuals interact and both their behaviors have an influence on
equilibrium prices. Arrow (1982) surveys empirical evidence for the proposition that "an
important class of intertemporal markets show systematic deviations from individual rational
behavior...".  Even in financial markets evidence suggests that the forces of competition are far6
from perfect. Ausubel (1991) presents a collection of data from the credit card market in the
1980's that shows the presumption of a competitive spot market equilibrium to be empirically
unjustified. Over- and underreaction identified in stock and option markets provide other7
Cf. Thaler (1993) for a more comprehensive collection of  examples .8
Cf. Tversky / Kahneman (1988), p. 167.9
Banking is a specially rich field of one (or few) time decisions for the nonbank-agent. Examples include10
saving decisions for retirement or  bank loans to buy a home or to start a business.  
Cf. Paese/Sniezek (1991).11
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striking examples.8
Often it is also objected that learning from past experience will eliminate biases.  The advocates9
of this thesis believe that the anomalies identified in experimental research do not translate to
real world decisions. They argue that specialists and experts as well as individuals which
perform repeatedly the same task account for a large portion of real world economic activity and
that they learn to be less prone to departures from ationality. Therefore the observed deviations
from rational behavior should not matter as this behavior does not persist in the long run.  
Beside the fact that there are many important decision making tasks which are not repeated for
the agents involved, evidence is mixed whether experience and repetition will substantially10
reduce biases at all. Tversky and Kahneman (1982) found sophisticated knowledge of statistics
not to eliminate some observed judgement anomalies. In particular situations experience eve
exacerbates biases. So experts are often more prone to overconfidence than laypersons. In11
general, research does not support the strong hypotheses that biases disappear with increased
experience.
A third common objection is more fundamental. It is argued that there surely exist anomalies in
individual behavior and the deviations from EUT might even be systematic. But there is just no
alternative theory available, which can take into account the behavioral findings without giving
up too much of the analytical power and elegance of EUT at the same time.
It is one of the main intentions of this paper to demonstrate this last argument to be false.
Introducing behavioral findings into banking theory does not necessarily imply the departure
from a formal analysis. There exist behavioral concepts that are easy includable into existing
banking models and result in interesting and more realistic results.
It is the completely different nature of the interacting parties, which makes banking theory
It is quite surprising that banking theory was mostly ignored by behavioral economists so far. There hardly12
exists any "Behavioral Banking Theory", though some neoclassical papers allow behavioral
interpretations.E.g. the analysis on divergent opinions in Chan/Kanatas (1985) might be interpreted as
addressing the phenomenon overconfidence.
As the decision maker in small and medium companies is in general the owner or manager relying at best13
on a few collaborators, the decision processes are quite similar to those of an individual.
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especially attractive for the incorporation of psychological findings. Banks are in contrast to12
their clients hardly susceptible to departures from rationality. Actually delegation may create
principal-agent problems in banks but well-defined procedures limit the scope of an employe
as well as preceding and following committees prepare and review the individual's decision. Due
to the larger number of undertaken or examined projects the bank has moreover excellent
possibilites to gain experience and to optimize its decision behavior. In our understanding of
"Behavioral Banking Theory"  the banks are therefore assumed to be fully rational decision
makers.
The client on the other hand is usually an individual. In many cases his behavior does not13
satisfy the requirements of full rationality. He might rely on heuristics; emotions might influence
his decisions, so his behavior might be characterized by several anomalies. Due to the lack of a
large number of similar projects he cannot rely on past experience. He usually is limited in his
analytical capacity and has no or few controlling instances. 
Anticipating its client*s departures from rationality banks could benefit by offering products
which incorporate particular anomalies such as time preferences or loss aversion, by consid ring
these phenomena in setting prices and conditions, or by addressing these deviations in its
marketing activities. Thus behavioral banking theory is not just a descriptive theory. From the
bank's decision making point of view it's a normative analysis. By correctly anticipating their
clients departures of rationality and incorporating it into their decisions the banks in our model
even show a higher level of rationality.
In this paper we exemplarily introduce a simple model of a loan market with loss averse
entrepreneurs. We study how the very robust phenomenon of loss aversion alters the classical,
well known results about the incentive and compensation effects of collat ralization. While loss
aversion has similar influence on second best equilibrium contracts (given a moral hazard
problem due to the unobservability of effort choice) as liquidation costs of collateral, it provides
an additonal private information problem. Since loss neutral entrepreneurs can gain from
 Cf. Rudolph (1984), Stulz/Johnson (1985)14
An overview on this topic can be found in Bester/Hellwig (1989)15
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claiming to be loss averse, the existence of self selection mechanisms has to be examined. We
find that there do exist situations where the second best contracts separate entrepreneurs of
different degrees of loss aversion. Hence banks can use the second best contracts even in the
private information case. 
In the next chapters we will give a short overview about the two streams of literature we
combine in our analysis. First we survey the most important results concerning the role of
collateral in loan markets with asymmetric information. Then we state the basic ideas of
Prospect Theory with special emphasis on loss aversion, one of its central concepts. In section
4 our model is presented and discussed. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Role of Collateral in Loan Contracts
In the last years much theoretical research has analyzed the role of collateral in loan contracts.
It should be noted that there exist two quite distinct understandings of the term collateral. Some
authors regarded collateral to be an asset that belongs to the borrowing firm and hence would be
available to the lenders in case of default anyway. Here the point of interest is the seniority of14
debt for different lenders, while the borrower's loss in case of default is not influenced by
additional collateralization. I  the more common second point of view collateral is understood
to be a private asset that is usually not attachable, but becomes available to the lender by
collateralization. In this case the provision of additional collateral increases the potenti l loss for
the borrower and might have incentive effects that influence the borrower's behavior. Our
analysis deals with the behavior of individual borrowers, thus we will adopt this point of view.
The incentive effects of collateral in the light of asymmetric information were analyzed before
from different perspectives. Bester (1987) and Besanko/Thakor (1987) show that collateral can
serve as a sorting device, when banks are confronted with borrowers of unobservable quality. If
there is a sufficient amount of collateral available credit rationing as introduced by
Stiglitz/Weiss (1981) cannot be persistent. Chan/Kanatas (1985) discuss how private15
information and differing beliefs about the project payoffs influence the degree of
collateralization in equilibrium. Bester (1994) considers the role of collateral with regard to a
Cf. Chan/Thakor (1987).16
Liquidation cost are already mentioned and their importance is discussed in the early work of Barro17
(1976).
Especially in this respect our explanation for the asymmetric evaluation of collateral differs from the18
liquidation cost approach.
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renegotiation of the loan. The impact of collateralization on the problem of combined Moral
Hazard and Private Information about the borrower quality is analyzed by Chan/Thakor (1987)
under different equilibrium concepts. 
Generally speaking collateral has two effects: an incentive effect and a compensation effect.
While the compensation effect (transfer of assets to the lender in case of default) alone cannot
explain the use of collateral as already shown by Modigliani/Miller (1958), the use of collateral
has positive effects on social welfare from the incentive point of view  (risk choice, effort,
signalling).  Assuming the compensation effect to be 'welfare neutral' it is easy to derive that16
loan contracts should be collateralized to the highest possible degree. The analysis gets more
interesting and the results more realistic if the compensation effect is assumed to have a negative
impact on welfare. That might be due to insufficient risk sharing as in Bester (1987) or to
transaction costs a sociated with the transfer and the liquidation of collateral. 17
In this paper we claim that there is another reason for a negative compensation effect of
collateralization, which is formally quite similar to the transaction cost approach, but has
different implications: individual borrowers might be more or less susceptible to loss aversion.
When cho sing between different loan contracts they perceive collateralization as a potential
loss, which has a higher impact on their evaluation of a given loan contract th the actual value
of the collateral. While under symmetric information collateralized contracts are thus inferior to
uncollateralized contracts, under asymmetric information regarding the entrepreneur's effort
choices collateral can weaken the moral hazard problem and lead to partially collateralized
contracts in equilibrium. In this respect our work is related to Boot/Thakor/Udell(1991), who
also consider the impact of collateral on unobservable effort choice. But while they restrict their
analysis to a discrete low/high-effort range and add private information about borrower quality,
we consider a continuous effort range and derive optimal degrees of collateralization dependent
on the strength of loss aversion. Further we address the very crucial problem that the degree of
loss aversion is a personal property and usually unobservable by the bank. Since banks will18
offer more attractive contracts to loss averse borrowers, which are supposed to spend more
Cf. Samuelson (1963), pp. 108.19
Cf. Knetsch (1989).20
Cf. Tversky / Kahneman (1991), pp. 1053.21
Cf. Kahneman/Knetsch/Thaler (1990).22
The aversion to small losses would imply extreme concavity of the utility func ion. To explain individuals'23
tendency to turn down 50/50 lotteries of losing $10 and winning $11 a concavity of the utility function has
to be assumed that makes individuals also turn down a 50/50 gamble of losin  $100 and winning $10,000.
(Rabin, 1996). It can be concluded from this thought experiment, that there must be a kink in the value
function separating gains from losses. 
Cf. Kahneman / Tversky (1979.24
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effort, all borr wers have the incentive to claim to be extremely loss averse. We will show that
in some situations banks can costlessly overcome this private information problem by offering
a set of self selecting contracts. 
3. Prospect Theory and Loss Aversion
Nobel laureate Paul Samuelson once proposed the following problem to a colleague: the equal
chance of winning $200 or losing $100. The colleague refused and stated: “I won*t bet because
I would feel the $100 loss more than the $200 gain." The phenomenon that losses loom larger19
than gains is called loss aversion and can be observed in various situations. Examples are the
increase in the perceived value of goods as soon as an individual is endowed with (endowment
effect) and the different evaluation of opportunity costs and expenses. In general, gains or20
improvements have to be more than twice as gr at in order to balance equal probable losses or
deteriorations. Ratios between 2:1 and 2,5:1 have been confirmed in various studies. These21
ratios, however, heavily depend on the type of goods to gain or lose. While the loss aversion
ratio is rather small for easy restorable daily use goods and goods purchased for resale much22
higher ratios have been found if health or personal wellbeing is affected.
The different impact of gains and losses on preferences is far too extreme to be explained by
income efects or risk aversion in the standard framework. A theory accounting for this and23
several other phenomena is Prospect Theory w ich was established by Kahneman and Tversky.24
It differs in three important manners from expected utility theory: 
1. It has been widely observed that people pay more attention to changes than to absolute levels
GainsLosses x
v
Prospect Theory
This concept is not really new, cf. e.g. Markowitz (1952).25
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Figure 1: The value function of Prospect Theory
which implies an evaluation of outcmes relative to a reference level. That is the reason
why the value function V is defined on changes in wealth and not on final asset
positions.25
2. Losses loom larger than gains. This fact is implemented by a value function that is steeper in
the loss domain than in the gain domain. In addition the value function reflects
diminishing sensitivity for losses and gains. This results in risk aversion in the gain
domain but risk seeking in the loss domain. 
3. Individuals misjudge probabilities in a systematic way. That's the reason why Prospect Theory
uses a probability weighting function measuring the weight an individual assigns to the
perceived probabilities of the consequences.
Figure 1 illustrates a typical value function of Prospect Theory. Note that the func ion has a kink
at the origin due to loss aversion. The curvature (concavity in the gain domain, convexity in the
loss domain) displays different risk attitudes for gains and losses. In our analysis we will neither
incorporate the diminishing sensitivity of the value function nor the concept of probability
weighting. We exclusively focus on loss aversion, thus we can clearly attribute our findings to
this phenomenon.
Here we understand by collateral funds external to the project, e.g. private assets of the entrepreneur.26
This does not mean a loss of generality. Effort isdefined by its influence on the success probability of the27
project. An effort value has no meaning in terms of disutility per se. Disutility enters the model by an
additional transformation of effort.
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In our model the borrowers have to post either collateral or pay higher interest rates on the loan
to offset for the default risk of their project.  Since the status qo (ex ante, i.e. when evaluating26
different loan offers) usually serves as the reference point, posting more collateral is perceived
as a potential higher loss. On the other hand higher interests a e evaluated as a reduced gain and
not as a loss. The asymmetry in the evaluation of collateral and higher interest rates resembles
the different treatment of opportunity costs and expenses. Thus, loss-averse entrepreneurs will
to a certain degree have a preference for higher interest rates.
4. The Model
We consider an economy with many entrepreneurs, each one endowed with an identical project
requiring an i put of 1$ in t=0 and yielding a stochastic return in t=1. For reasons of simplicity
we restrict the return to just two possible outcomes. With probability n the project yields X$,
with probability (1-n) the return is 0$. The entrepreneurs do not have any capital to invest into
their projects (but do have illiquid assets which can be used as external collateral) and hence
need to apply for a loan from a bank. The banks in our model have unlimited access to funds at
a riskless interest rate i. They are risk-neutral and compete for entrepreneurs. Hence they will
make 1$-loans to entrepreneurs, where the expected return from the investment is exactly I $
(I:=1+i). Given the competitive situation from now on we will focus on a single bank.
The probability of success n is influenced by the entrepreneur's choice of effort a0[0,1). If the
investor does not spend any effort at all, n corresponds to the basic success probability p<1,
which reflects external factors. More effort by the entrepreneur i c as s the success probability
n. We assume a linear relation n(a) = (1-p)a + p.Hence by spending an effort close to 1 th27
entrepreneur could make the project return almost riskless.
Spending effort causes some disutility d(a)0[0,-4) to the entrepreneur. Since the shape of the
disutility function is a crucial point of our analysis, the basic properties of an appropriate
We assume d to be twice differentiable.28
Except in the irrelevant cases, when the entrepreneur does not profit from a higher success probability at29
all. 
To be more explicit, we have to claim   z<(1-p)X   and  z<(X-I )  to avoid technical problems of a30 2 0,5 0,5 2 
corner solution a=0 in the following formal analysis. 
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disutility function should be highlighted:28
(1) d'(a) 0  , more effort causes more disutility.
(2) d''(a) 0 , the marginal disutility of effort is decreasing, i.e. an additional
increase in effort is more painful at a higher effort (i.e. higher
success probability) level 
(3) d(a)6-4  for  a61, trying to make a project almost riskless causes very much
disutility and will never be favorable 
(4) d'(0) =0  , a choice of a=0 (no effort at all) will never be favorable, since in29
each project there are a few possibilities to increase success
probability with hardly any disutility.
Considering these basic properties, we assume a disutility function: d(a):=z ln(1-a), for some
fixed z>0. It is easy to verify that this disutility function has the properties (1) to (3), but does
not fulfill (4). This could result in the unrealistic desirability of effort choices a=0. Since  d'(0)=-
z, we can control this problem and approximate property (4) by assuming a sufficiently small z.30
Throughout the paper we assume the influence of effort on the success probability, the possible
project outcomes and the ex post project realization to be common knowledge. We will alter the
assumptions about the observability of the effort choice and the preference structure of th
entrepreneurs. As a benchmark we start by analyzing the symmetric information case. 
Symmetric Information
It is assumed for now, that the entrepreneurs' effort choice is observable and that the bank knows
each entrepreneur's preference structure. A standard loan contract is a tripel (R,C,a), where
UB (R,C,a) :' n(a)(R)%(1&n(a))C ' I (1
R(C,a):' I&C
n(a)
%C
(2)
vk(y) :'
y , if y$0,
ky, if y<0,
We will see that C=I is the highest possible degree of collateralization, used in a fully collateralized (I,I,a)-31
contract.
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R0[I,X] is the face value of the debt, C0 [0,R] defines the amount of collateral and a0 [0,1) is
the degree of effort to be invested by the entrepreneur. The face value R incorporates both the
repayment of the loan and the payment of interest r to th  bank. As the bank refinances its loans
at a rate i, this rate is the minimum level for r. The term collateral refers to external illiquid
assets. These assets can neither be used to finance the project initially nor can they be seized by
the bank in case of default unless they are explicitly defined as collateral. There are no
limitations on the amount of collateral available on the side of the entrepreneurs, i.e. in case of
default they are able to liquidate assets up to I$. 31
A contract (R,C,a) is called acceptable by the bank, if the bank's expected return equals I, i.e.:
Note that a fully collateralized (I,I,a)-contract is acceptable by th b nk for all effort levels a. By
R(a,C) we define the face value necessary to let the contract (R(a,C),C,a) be acceptable by the
bank. We have:   
 All entrepreneurs are endowed with exactly the
same projects and have the same disutility function. They differ, however, in their evaluation of
the project outcomes. As suggested by Prospect Theory (Kahneman/Tversky, 1979, 1992) and
introduced in section 3 we assume the entrepreneurs to have different degrees of loss aversion.
Thus losses might have more impact on an individual's evaluation than gains of the s me size.
We implement this fact into our model by defining an entrepreneur`s value function by
where y is the change of wealth relative to the status quo and k$1
measures the individual's degree of loss aversion. We ignore other ideas of Prospect Theory such
as diminishing sensitivity and probability weighting and exclusively focus on the asymmetric
evaluation of gains and losses. An entrepreneur with degree of  loss aversion k will be called a
a('1& z
(1&p) X
(4)
Vk(R,C,a) :' n(a)vk(X&R)%(1&n(a))vk(&C)%d(a) ' n(a)(X&R)%(1&n(a))(&kC)%d(a) (3)
The proof of the positivity of a* can be found in Corollary A3 in the Appendix. 32
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Prop.1: a.) The first best contract to offer an entrepreneur of type k>1 is of the
form (R(0,a*),0,a*), where :              
 
b.) For a 1-type entrepreneur all contracts of the form (R(C,a*),C,a*) with
C0[0,I] are first best contracts and may exist in equilibrium.
k-type. A k-type's evaluation of a risky alternative is given by the expected value of the v-k
transformed wealth changes. Note that a 1-type entrepreneur is a standard r k-neutral (expected
value maximizing) decision maker. Hence our analysis includes the well known case of an
overall risk neutral economy.
The evaluation of a (R,C,a)-contract by a k-type-entrepreneur is given by:
In the symmetric information case the degree of loss aversion of each individual entrepreneur is
common knowledge. In equilibrium we then will have first best contracts that under all
acceptable contracts maximize each k-type's evaluation V.k
This result is intuitively clear and we skip the straightforward formal proof. The effort a*
maximizes the total welfare of the project and is found by equating marginal disutiliy and
marginal project return. For a loss-neutral (1-type) entrepreneur there are several acceptable
(R,C,a*) contracts which differ by the return distribution between the bank and the entrepreneur
in case of success and failure without changing expected values. For loss-averse (type k>1)
entrepreneurs the use of collateral decreases welfare. In case of default the entrepreneur
experiences a loss of kC while the bank just gains C. Hence the avoidance of collateral and the
incorporation of project risk into higher interest rates r leads to the only first best contract
(R(0,a*),0,a*).32
ak(R,C) ' 1&
z
(1&p)(X&R%kC)
(5
ak
opt (R,C) ' 1& z
(1&p)(X&C%kC)
(6)
In Corollary A3 in the Appendix it is shown that for all relevant contracts (R,C) the effort a(R,C) will33 k
always be positive.
The socially optimal effort for a k-type-entrepreneur given an (R,C)-contract can be derived from the fact34
that in case of default there is a wlfare loss of (k-1)C due to the asymmetric evaluation of the transferred
collateral. 
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Moral Hazard
Next we consider the more realistic case of asymmetric information about the effort level chosen
by the entrepreneurs. If banks cannot observe an entrepreneur's effort, contracts cannot be
defined contingent on the effort level a. Then a loan contract  is simply of the form (R,C).
Given an (R,C)-contract a k-type will choose an effort level a(R,C) to m ximize his welfare, i.e.k
     a(R,C) = argmax  {n(a)(X-R) + (1-n(a))(-kC) + d(a)}.k a0 [0,1)
Solving this maximization problem we get:          33
Two easy observations about the endogenous effort choice a(R,C) f llow in order.k
1. Monotonicity:  a(R,C) is increasing in C and decreasing in R. Thus while higherk
collateralization leads to additional effort, a shrinking excess return X-R causes effort to
decrease. For C>0 the effort a(R,C) is increasing i k, so in case of a collateralized loank
a more loss averse entrepreneur will spend more effort.  
2. Suboptimality: Except in the case of a fully collateralized contract with C=R the effort
level a(R,C) chosen by an entrepreneur is always lower than the socially optimal effortk
level:   34
This is due to the fact, that the entrepreneur profits only partially from a high effort and
thus a higher project success probability. Unless the contract is fully collateralized (and
the bank gets a riskless return of I) part of the higher ecpected project return increases
the bank's expected profit. Hence the entrepreneur has less incentive to spend effort. 
The bank has to take into account the optimizing behavior of the entrepreneur when offering a
contract (R,C) as the contract induces a certain effort level. As we have seen above this effort
level depends on the entrepreneur's degree of loss aversion reflected by the coefficient k. A
R° :' X%I&z
2
&
(X%I&z)2
4
&IX (7
µ R
2&(X%I&z)R%IX
k(R&I)%z
(8)
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Lemma 2: For each k$1 the contract (R°,0) with 
is k-stable.  
Prop. 3:  a.) For all R 0 [I,R°] and all k$1 there exists a unique C(R)0 [0,I] s.t. (R,C(R))k k
is a k-stable contract. 
  b.) The function C(R): [1,4)V[I,R°] 6 [0,I], (k,R)k
is continuous in k and R, strictly decreasing in R and on [1,4)V(I,R°) strictly
decreasing in k .
contract (R,C) is called k-stable, if the contract (R,C,a(R,C)) is acceptable by the bank. A k-k
stable contract yields an expected return I for the bank, if the entrepreneur has chosen his
optimal effort level given the contract (R,C).
Obviously the fully collateralized contract (I,I) is a k-stable contract for all k$1. The other
extreme, an uncollateralized k-stable contract, is presented in the following lemma.
Proof:For C=0 the effort a(R,0) and hence the expected return to the bank does not depend onk
k. Solving U(R,0,a(R,0))=I for R gives R°.  It remains to show:B k
a.) the discriminant is positive,       b.) R°$I     and    c.) a(R°,0) >0. k
The proofs of these properties can be found in lemma A1 and A2 in the appendix.     
In addition to these two extremes there are further k-stable contracts with intermediate degrees
of collateralization. The most important properties of k-stable contracts are summarized in th
following proposition.
Proof:The functional form of C(R) is derived by solving U(R,C(R),a(R,C(R)))=I  fork B k k k
C (R). The continuity of C(R) is obvious. The numerator  R-(X+I-z) +IX isk k
2
A lower amount of collateral always decreases the expected return for the bank. Here both effects work in35
the same direction. Less collateral means less return in case of default and less incentive for the
entrepreneur to spend effort. 
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nonnegative and strictly decreasing in R o  [I,½(X+I-z)] e [I,R°] The denominator k(R-
I)+z is positive and strictly increasing in R. Hence C(R) is strictly decreasing in R ok
[I,R°] for all k$1. With C(I)=I  and C(R°)=0 we get C(R) 0 [0,I] for all R0 [I,R°]. Thek k k
monotonicity of C(R) in k on [1,4)V(I,R°) is obvious.     k
   
What is the intuition behind this result? The more lossaverse the entrepreneur the higher is his
incentive to avoid default of the project and the loss of collateral. Hence he will choose a higher
level of effort resulting in a higher success probability of the project. Anticipating this higher
effort the bank can decrease the amount of collateral which is necessary to break even. The
result concerning the increase of R is less obvious. Charging a higher face value R results
directly in a higher return for the bank in case of project success. On the other hand a higher face
value R decreases the incentive for the entrepreneur to spend effort which results in a lower
success probability of the project. Prop. 3 above states that the former effect (return increase)
dominates the latter one (success probability decrease). A higher R increases the bank's expected
return which will be adjusted by a lower amount of collateral C.  35
The two extreme contracts (R°,0) and (I,I) are k-stable for all k$1 as c n be seen in figure 2,
where curves of k-stables contracts are displayed for k=1,2,3,4. The reason for the overall k-
stability is quite different in the two cases. The (R°,0) contract provides the same expected
return for the bank independent of the entrepreneur`s loss aversion, because loss aversion does
not play any role in contracts without collateral. Hence all k-types choose the same amount of
effort which results in the same expected return for the bank. Given a (I,I) contract as the other
extreme, the more lossaverse entrepreneurs choose a higher effort level which leads to a higher
success probability of the project. But since in a fully collateralized contract the banks return is
riskless the higher success probability does not have any impact on the bank's expected return.
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figure 2: k-stable contracts for k=1,2,3,4.
Prop. 4: Offering the fully collateralized 1-stable (I,I)-contract to an 1-type
entrepreneur leads to the unique second best solution given the moral hazard
problem. It equals the first best solution even though effort choice is not
observable and therefore not contractable.
Now let us turn to the question which of the k-stable contracts the bank will offer to a k-type in
equilibrium, i.e. which k-stable contract (R,C ) provides the second best solution for a k-k k
opt opt
type entrepreneur given the moral hazard problem. For k=1 this question has a well known
answer and is easy to derive.
Proof: From prop. 1 we know that an acceptable contract (R,C,a) is a first best solution, iff
. All 1-stable contracts (R,C(R),a(R,C(R)) are acceptable and1 1 1
we have: .     a(R,C(R) equals a* iff R=C(R)=I.1 1 1
ak(R) ' 1 &
1
(1&p)
K(R&I)%z
(k&1)R%X
(9)
Md(ak(R)
MR
k(R,C) ' 1&
z
(1&p)(X&R%kC
Ck(R) '
R 2&(X%I&z)R%IX
k(R&I)%z
Md(ak(R))
MR
Md(ak(R))
MR
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Lemma 5:  is positve, strictly increasing in k and strictly decreasing in R on
[I,R°]x[1,4).
 
For a risk- and loss-neutral entrepreneur full collateralization results in optimal contracts. This
is due to the fact that collateral provides a positive incentive effect without causing any
disadvantages at the same time. For lossaverse entrepreneurs, however, the role of collateral is
ambivalent. On the one hand it provides an incentive for the entrepreneur to choose an effort
level closer to the social optimum. On the other hand the possible transfer of collateral results in
a reduction of total welfare, due to the fact that the entrepreneur's evaluation of the collateral
loss is not fully compensated by the evaluation of the gain on the bank's side. In the following
paragraphs we analyse the trade off between the two effects.
We start by closer examining the effort  spent by
 as a response to a k-stable contract. For each R 0 [I,R°] the effort resulting fromk-entrepreneurs
the k-stable contract (R,C(R)) is called the k-stable effort given R and denoted by a (R).  Byk k
substitution of    into  a(R,C) we get:     k
The marginal disutility following from this k-stable effort a(R) plays an importantk
role in the optimization process. In corollary A5 in the appendix the following properties of
are shown:
X # I%z% I 2%4Iz
Uk(R,Ck(R)) ' n(ak(R))(X&R)%(1&n(ak(R)))(&kCk(R))%d(ak(R)) (10)
Uk(R,Ck(R)) ' X&R&z % d(ak(R)) (11)
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Prop. 6a: If  then it holds for the second best contract (R,C ):k k
opt opt
(1)  R :[1,4) 6 [I,R°] , k µ R  is continuous, strictly increasing andopt optk
R (k) 0 (I,R°) for all k0 (1,4).opt
(2) C :[1,4) 6 [0,I] , k µ C  is continuous, strictly decreasing andopt optk
C (k) 0 (0,I)   for all k0 (1,4).opt
 Now we address the central question: how does the degree of loss aversion k influence the
amount of collateral used in the second best contract (R,C )? We will show that fullk k
opt opt
collateralization will never be optimal except for a lossneutral 1-type entrepreneur. The other
extreme, an uncollateralized contract (R°,0), can exist as the second best solution for high k-
types. But its appearance as an equilibrium contract requires the project outcome X to be
relatively high compared to the refinancing rate I. Otherwise second best contracts include some
collateralization for all degrees of loss aversion. We will first discuss the latter case. 
Proof:(1) A k-type entrepreneur will respond to a k-stable contract (R,C(R)) by choosingk
an effort a(R) and thus experiencing a disutility d(a(R)). His welfare out of thek k
contract is given by:
By substituting a(R) and C(R) into the two left terms and doing some easyk k
transformations the term simplifies to:
For each k$1 this expression has to be maximized in R on [I,R°]. The first order
R FOCk '
&kX&(k&1)(z&Ik)
2(k&1)k
%
(kX%(k&1)(z&Ik))2
4(k&1)2k2
%
z(X%Ik&z)
k
%
XI
k&1
(14)
Md(ak(R))
MR
' 1
ak(R) '1&
1
(1&p)
K(R&I)%z
(k&1)R%X
Mak(R)
MR
'
&1
(1&p)
kX%(k&1)(kI&z)
[(k&1)R%X]2
(12
Md(ak(R))
MR
'
&z
Mak(R))
MR
1&ak(R)
k&1)kR2 % [(k&1)(z&Ik)%kX]R & z(X%Ik&z)(k&1)&XIk ' 0 (13
Uk(R,Ck(R))
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condition is given by: and by substitution of
      and    
 into    we get the equation:
 
For k=1 this equation is linear and has the unique solution R=I, which we already
know from prop. 4. For k>1 it is easy to see that only
      
the larger of the two solutions of the quadratic FOC, is greater than I.
In lemma A8 in the appendix R<R° is shown for all k$1. The concavity ofk
FOC
d(a(R)) in R which we know from lemma 5 directly yields the concavity ofk
in R on [I,R°]. This implies R= R . From lemma A6 in thek k
opt FOC 
appendix it follows that R and thus R  strictly increase in k. From thek k
FOC opt 
monotonicity and R = I it can be concluded that: R(k) 0 (I,R°) for all1
opt opt
k0(1,4). 
(2) C   = C(R ) is obviously continuous in k.  Since C(R) is decreasing in k andk k k k
opt opt
strictly decreasing in R, we get from (1) that C(R )  strictly decreases in k. Fork k
opt
all k 0 (1,4) we can conclude from R in (I,R°) and prop. 3 b) that C in (0,I).k k
opt opt

Next we consider the case where X is high relative to I and z. Here we find that for high degrees
of loss aversion contracts without any collateral can indeed provide the second best solution.
X > I%z% I 2%4Iz
X > I%z% I 2%4Iz R FOCk >R° ] k>k0
Uk (R,Ck(R)) ' X&R&z % d(ak(R)
R optk0 'R
FOC
k0
'R°
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Prop. 6b: If  then there exists a unique k 0 (1,4) s.t.  C and R0
opt opt
are continuous functions on [1,4) with:
(1)  R (k) = R° for all k $ k and R (k) is strictly increasing on [1,k].opt opt0 0
(2)  C (k) = 0 for all k $ and C (k) is strictly decreasing on [1,k].opt opt0 0
Proof:The proof is an easy extension of the proof of prop. 6 a).  It is shown in lemma A8 in the
appendix that for there exists a k with .0
From lemma 5 we know the concavity of d(a(R)) and can conclude the concavity ofk
 in R on [I,R°]. This implies R= R for allk k
opt FOC 
k0[1,k]. With lemma A6 in the appendix it follows that Rand thus R strictly0 k k
FOC opt  
increase in k on [1,k]. The continuity of Ron [1,k] is derived from the obvious0 k 0
opt  
continuity of R and we further have: . k
FOC  
For k>k we have R  >R° and the k-type's welfare U(R,C(R)) strictly increases on0 k k k
FOC
[I,R°]. Hence it follows R= R°. The overall continuity of R is obvious.k k
opt opt
The proof of (2) is trivial. The properties of C = (R ) are directly derived fromk k k
opt opt
lemma 2 and prop. 3.     
The propositions 6a and 6b state that fully collateralized cont cts are optimal just in the special
case of a loss neutral entrepreneur. The more loss averse the entrepreneur the less collateral
should be provided and partial collateralization might be optimal even when there is no limit on
the availability of illiquid assets. Figure 3 shows the equilibrium contracts for different k-types
and parameters as considered in proposition 6a.
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figure 3:  equilibrium contracts
In section 2 it was already mentioned that our analysis can also be interpreted from a different
point of view. If we assume liquidation costs attached to the transfer f collateral an asymmetric
valuation of collateral is given even for risk neutral entrepreneurs. Then  represents a
liquidation cost factor, i.e. collateral worth C to the entrepreneur means a compensation of 
for the  bank. 
While it was shown by other authors before, that liquidation costs of collateral might outweigh36
the positive incentive effects of collateralization, our analysis can provide more detailed results
about the strength of the counteracting effects. If the succes return X is not too high (relative to
I) we can conclude from the reinterpreted proposition 6a that contracts should always be
partially collateralized even when collateral transfer causes very high liquidation costs (i.e. k is
very high).  
22
Though the formal analysis might be similar to transaction cost models we explicitly want to
stress the differences of the two approaches. We argue that in addition to the obvious tra saction
costs of collateral, which we could easily add to our model, there might be some even more
important, but less obvious costs due to loss aversion. While liquidations cost are objective and
observable, loss aversion is subjective and could remain unconsidered by banks. But as we have
seen in prop. 6a and 6b, social welfare could be increased by taking loss aversion into account.
So far we ignored a very severe problem concerning the observability of loss aversion for the
bank. Unless banks have  long time relationship to a borrower and thus are able to learn about
his preferences, the individual degree of loss aversion is private information. Every entrepreneur
has an incentive to propose a very high degree of loss aversion, since he knows that the banks
will then offer better contracts in expectation of a higher effort choice. If the degree of loss
aversion is unobservable, separating contracts do not seem to be viable. But in the following
paragraph we will show that private information about the degree of loss aversion does not
necessarily imply the pooling of all types of entrepreneurs at one contract. 
Moral Hazard and Private Information about the degree of loss aversion.
Our prevailing analysis relied on the rather unrealistic assumption that each individual
entrepreneur's degree of loss aversion would be known to the bank. However in general a bank
can not observe an entrepreneur's degree of loss aversion ex ante (and can not even conclude it
ex post as the entrepreneur's choice of effort is unobservable.) Henc  the degree of loss aversion
is private information and contracts can not be written contingent on a degree of loss aversion.
This would make it impossible for the bank to offer k-stable contracts to k-type entrepreneurs.
Entrepreneurs would have an incentive to state very high degrees of loss aversion in order to get
offered a contract with a very low amount of collateral C for a fixed R. 
However this argument only holds, if the bank offers the full range of k-stable contracts. The
low-k-type does not necessarily want to switch to the high-k-type contract, if the bank restrict
itselfs to a discrete set of contracts each one designed for a special k-type. In the following we
assume that there exist just two types of entrepreneurs. Some entrepreneurs are rational expected
value maximizers, i.e. 1-types, the others are more emotional, loss averse entrepreneurs, i.e. k-0
(R opt1 ,C
opt
1 ) and (R
opt
k0
,C optk0 )
R optk0 ,C
opt
k0
R opt1 ,C
opt
1
R opt1 ,C
opt
1
C optk0 > 0 R
opt
k0
,C optk0
C optk0 < C1(R
opt
k0
)
R optk0 ,C
opt
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(R optk0 ,C1(R
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R opt1 ,C
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types with k>1. The bank can not distinguish between the different types. 0
What will happen, if the bank offers the two second best contracts 
to all entrepreneurs applying for a loan? The k-types will choose their second best contrac0
, since = ( I,I ) is also a  k-stable contract. The problem arises for 1-types.0
They maximize their utility on the 1-stablecontract curve by choosing  = ( I,I ) . But
whenever the contract   is not a 1-stable contract. From prop.6a and
prop.6b we know that in this case and thus for the 1-type entrepreneur th
contract  is more attractive than the 1-stable contract . Hence though
we know that  is preferred to , we do not know whether it is also
preferred to the more attractive contract . The figures 4 and  5 demonstrate that there
is no general answer to this question. In the figures the 1-stable and 2.5-stable curves are plotted
and the second best contracts are marked.
(R opt1 ,C
opt
1 )
R optk0 ,C
opt
k0
R opt1 ,C
opt
1 R
opt
k0
,C optk0
Cind1(R) ' R&X%Xe
I R
z
R optk0 ,C
opt
k0
C optk0 < Cind1(R
opt
k0
)
R optk0 ,C
opt
k0
R opt1 ,C
opt
1
R optk0 ,C
opt
k0
R opt1 ,C
opt
1
lim
X64
R optk ' I%z
k&1
k
lim
X64
R°'
R optk0 ,C
opt
k0
C optk0
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Prop. 7: If X is sufficiently high, then the second best contracts and
 separate the entrepreneurs, i.e. 1-type entrepreneurs choose th
contract   and  k-type entrepreneurs choose . In this0
case the private information about the degree of loss aversion does not cause
any additional contractual costs. 
By adding the indifference curve of the 1-type which is given by to
the figure 4. we can see that the 1-type would prefer the contract , since
. Thus contracts are not self separating but pool all entrepreneurs at the
contract . In figure 5. the value for X is increased from 1.8 to 2.2. Now the 1-types
prefer the contract   = ( I,I ) . Here the two contracts separate the entrepreneurs.  k-0
types cho se their second best contract   and 1-types choose their second best
contract . 
We can state a more general result:
Proof: The formal proof is technical and therefore moved to lemma A9 in the appendix. The
central observation is that  while . Therefore for an
increasing X the contract  approaches the 1-stable contract (R°,0). Since the
1-type strictly prefers the (I,I) contract to the (R°,0) contract it can be shown by
continuity arguments that for high X the 1-types choose (I,I) (even ifis still greater
than zero.)           
5. Conclusion
Neoclassic banktheoretic modelling assumes all decision makers to be rational expected utility
maximizers. This ignores the huge amount of evidence for anomalies in individual decision
Cf. Berger/Udell  (1990).37
It is by no means a trivial fact, that a(I) > a(R ).38 opt1 k k
making found by psychologists. Many of these behavioral concepts are easily includabl into the
analysis of bank theoretic problems without giving up power and elegance of formal argument.
As an example we analyzed the impact of loss aversion on the degree of collateralization in a
loan market equilibrium. Optimal contracts under asymmetric information are derived for
different degrees of loss aversion. It is i teresting to note that only in the classical case of a risk
neutral entrepreneur fully collateralized contracts appear as second best solutions. For los
averse entrepreneurs the trade off between the positive incentive effect and the negative
compensation effect of collateral leads to partially collateralized or uncollateralized contracts.
We derive the intuitive result that the more loss averse the entrepreneur, the less collateral is
used in equilibrium. Finally the problem of private information regarding the degree of loss
aversion is analyzed. It turns out that for specific parameter settings a pair of second best
contracts might serve as a self selection device. 
There is a wide area of further research questions on this topic. On the one hand other or
additional behavioral findings should be applied to the question of optimal collateralization.
Two features of Prospect Theory, which were ignored in our analysis, promise interesting
results. Diminishing sensitivity as well as probability weighting are intuitively supposed to
weaken the effects of loss aversion demonstrated in our model. The robust phenomenon of
entrepreneur overconfidence is easily includable into our analysis, too.
On the other hand there remain many open questions even in the pure loss aversion case. As one
interesting example the contribution of our analysis to the discussion about the relation between
collateralization and project risk should be examined. It can be shown that loss averse37
entrepren urs spend less effort in equilibrium than loss neutral entrepreneurs. In combination38
with our results about collateralization this implies that the less collateralized project has th
lower success probability. It is unclear though, whether this result can be extended to all
different degrees of  loss aversion.
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    figure 4:  pooling contracts
    figure 5: separating contracts
Finally there are many other interesting bank theoretic questions ( e.g. renegotiation of loan
contracts, usage of credit lines, bank run analysis), where the departure from "homo
economicus" will lead to more realistic descriptions of observed human behavior. 
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Lemma A1:       is positive and  .
Lemma A2:  is positive. 
Appendix  
Proof:The positivity of the discriminant follows directly from our assumption on the size of z:
. It can be derived in order:
  ,    ,      and    . 
To see the positivity of R° note that: . 
Using this equality we can conclude: 
 
            .

Proof:First we show .
From         we can conlude, that
      
a(k (R,C)'1&
z
(1&p) (X&R%kC)
aoptk (R,C)'1&
z
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Corollary A3:For all relevant (R,C)-contracts and all k$1 the effort levels
 ,  and
are positive. 
Lemma A4: (1) a(R) is positive on [1,4)x[I,R°] .k
(2) a(R) is strictly decreasing in R and (not necessarily strictly) increas ngk
in k on  [14)x[I,R°].
(3) is (not necessarily strictly) increasing in R and strictly
decreasing in k on [1,4)x[I,R°].
Taking roots on both sides yields: .
Next we derive from our assumptions:    and  that
 and thus   . 
That gives us: .        
  Proof:It is obvious that for all relevant (R,C)-contracts the above mentioned effort levels are
greater than a(R°,0) and the proposition follows from lemma A2.    k
Proof:(2) We know from prop. 3 that an increase in R results in a decrease of C(R).  Bothk
changes have a negative impact on the effort chosen. This proves the strict
monotonicity in R. 
For R=I the formula for a(R) simplifies to:  k
and the monotonicity in k is obvious. For RI the k-stability condition reads:  
Md(ak(R)
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Corollary A5:(1) d(a(R)) is negative on [1,4)x[I,R°] .k
(2) d(a(R)) is strictly increasing in R and (not necessarily strictly)k
decreasing in k on [1,4)x[I,R°].
(3)  is strictly decreasing in R and strictly increasing in k on
[1,4)x[I,R°].
. From prop. 3 we know that C(R) strictlyk
decreases in k for R<R° and is constant in k for R=R°. Hence n(a(R)) and thusk
a(R) increases in k for RI.k
(1) Using (2) it suffices to show a(R°)>0. This fact is known from lemma A2.     k
(3)  a (R) is continuously differentiable in R and k on [1,4)x[I,R°] and we have:k
. The monotonicity of   in R is
obvious  (for k>1 we even have strict monotonicity).
Next consider: . By definition of R° the
numerator of this term is nonnegative and strictly decreasing in R on
[1,4)x[I,R°]. The positive denominator is increasing in R on [1,4)x[I,R°]
(strictly increasing for k>1). Thus  strictly decreases in R on
[1,4)x[I,R°]. Since we know  for the totally differentiable
function a(R) this proves the strict monotonicity of   in k onk
[1,4)x[I,R°].    
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Lemma A6: For all with  it holds: .
Proof: (1) and (2) directly follow from the properties of d(a) and lemma A4.    
(3) It holds: .  From lemma A4 we know that the
positive numerator increases and the positive denominator strictly decreases in
R on [1,4)x[I,R°]. This implies the strict monotonicity of   in R on
[1,4)x[I,R°].
The strict monotonicity in k on [1,4)x[I,R°] follows in the same way from
lemma A4. The positive numerator strictly decreases and the positive
denominator increases in R on [1,4)x[I,R°].    
Proof: Consider a in [1,4) with . By definition of R we have:k
FOC 
and for a sufficiently small g>0 we can conclude
 from the monotonicity of   in k shown in
corollary A5.  Using the monotonicity of  in R
  implies  .      
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Lemma A7:
Proof:The rewritten term: 
is of the the form   , where f(k), g(k) 6 0 for
k64. The continuity of the root-function implies: . 
Defining   the following inequalities are
equivalent:   ,  ,
        und ) > 0.
By the concavity of the root-function there are further equivalent:
,
,
,
       and 
X # I%z% I 2%4Iz R FOCk <R°
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FOC
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$ R° R FOCk > R°
lim
k64
R FOCk < R° X < I%z% I
2%4Iz
R FOCk < R°
R FOCk X ' I%z% I
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Lemma A8: (1) If ,    then   for all k$1.
(2) If , then there exists a k, such that 0
.
.
The proof  for  <  and  =  is analogous.  
Proof:First we show:  (*)   for implies for all k> k.2 1
For that assume there exist k, k with k>k ,  and . Without1 2 2 1
loss of generality we can assume , since with the strict monotonicity of
 in k shown in lemma A6 we could otherwise replace k by k-g. Now choose the2 2
largest k in [k,k] mit . The continuous function   maps the interval3 1 2
[k ,k ] in [I,R°] and thus by lemma A6 strictly increases on [k,k ]. This contradicts3 2 3 2
 .
(1) For we know from lemma A7 that .  If
there exists a with we know from (*) that for
all k>k in contradiction to . Hence for 1
we have for all k$1. 
By the obvious continuity of in X we conclude for 
the property: for all k$1. Using (*) again we can not have any k$1
with . So  also implies for all k$1.
 
(R opt1 ,C
opt
1 )
R optk0 ,C
opt
k0
R opt1 ,C
opt
1 R
opt
k0
,C optk0
X > I%z% I 2%4Iz lim
k64
R FOCk > R°
R FOC1 ' I R
FOC
k
R FOCk0 ' R° R
FOC
k < R°
R FOCk > R°
lim
X64
R°' I lim
X64
R optk ' I%z
k&1
k
A 2%B B
2A
B
2A
/0( A 2%B &A) /0 <
B
2A
lim
A64
( A 2%B &A)'0
X&I&z
2
lim
X64
X&I&z
2
2
&Iz &X&I&z
2
' lim
A64
A 2%B&A ' 0
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Lemma A9: If X is sufficiently high, then the second best contracts   and
 separate the entrepreneurs, i.e.. 1-type entrepreneurs choose the
contract   and  k-type entrepreneurs choose . In this0
case the private information about the degree of loss aversion does not cause
any additional contractual costs. 
(2) For we know from lemma A7 that  .
Since furthermore  the continuity of implies the existence of
a k with  For the smallest such k we know on [1,k)0 0 0
and (*) implies on (k,4). 0
Proof: The proof is in two steps:
(1)  First we show that       and     
(2)  Then we argue that this implies the proposition
ad (1)From the fact that  is in [A,A+ ]  ( [A+ ,A] resp.)  for all A>0 and
B$-A , we can conclude: and thus:               2
(*)   .
This gives for A: =   and  B: = - Iz :
.
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It follows: 
   
     
 We can further write
     
as
and by rearranging the discriminant we get:
,
where B does not depend on X.
Defining we conclude with (*):
ad (2):With  we get  for sufficiently high X. Since (I,I) is
optimal for the 1-type on the 1-stable curve we must have C(R°) < 0.  Combiningind 1
theses facts we have for sufficiently high X: .
This implies that the 1-type prefers the (I,I) contract to thecontract.
By continuity arguments it can be shown that there must exist some X (high, but not too
high) such that the contracts are separating i.e. ), without
requiring to be zero.    
33
References:
Arrow, K. J. (1982): Risk Perception in Psychology and Economics. Economic Inquiry, Vol.  20,
S. 1-9.
Ausubel, L. M. (1991): The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market. American Economi
Review, Vol. 81, S. 50-81.
Barro, R.J. (1976): The Loan market, collateral, and rates of interest. Journal of Money, Credit, and
Banking, Vol. 8, S. 439-456.
Berger, A. N., Udell, G. F. (1990): Collateral, Loan Quality, and Bank Risk. Journal of Monetary
Economics, Vol. 25, S. 21-42.
 
Besanko, D., Thakor, A.V.  (1987): Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic
and Competitve Markets. International Economic Review, Vol. 28, S. 671-689.
Bester, H. (1987): The Role of Collatera  in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information. European
Economic Review, Vol. 31, S. 887-899.
Bester, H. (1994): The Role of Collateral in a Model of Debt Renegotiation. Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking, Vol. 26, S. 72-86.
Bester, H., Hellwig, M. (1989): Moral Hazard and Equilibrium Credit Rationing: An Overview of
the Issues, in: Agency Theory, Information, and Incentives, Bamberg, G., Spremann, K. (Hrsg.),
korrigierter Nachdruck der 1. Auflage, Berlin u.a., S. 135-166.
Boot, A. Thakor, A.V., Udell, G. (1991): Secured lending and default risk: Equilibrium analysis,
policy implications and empirical results. The Economic Journal, Vol. 101.
Chan, Y.-S., Kanatas, G. (1985): Asymmetric valuations and the role of collateral in loan
agreements. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Vol. 17, S. 84-95.
Chan, Y.-S., Thakor, A.V. (1987): Collateral and competitive equilibria with moral hazard and
private information. Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, S. 345-363.
De Bondt, W., Thaler, R. (1985): Does the stock market overreact ? Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, S.
793-808.
De Bondt, W., Thaler, R. (1987): Further evidence on investor overreaction and stock market
seasonality. Journal of Finance, Vol. 42, S. 557-582.
De Bondt, W., Thaler, R. (1990):  Do Security Analysts Overreact ? American Economic Review,
Vol 80, S. 52-57.
Haltiwanger, J., Waldmann, M.  (1985): Rational Expectations and the Limits of Rationality: An
Analysis of Heterogeneity. American Economic Review, Vol. 75, S. 326-340.
34
Kahneman, D., Knetsch, J.L., Thaler, R. (1990):Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and
the Coase Theorem . Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 98, S. 1325-1348.
 
Kahneman, D., Tversky, A. (1979): Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk.
Econometrica, Vol. 47, S. 263-291.
Knetsch, J.L. (1989): The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves.
American Economic Review, Vol. 79, S. 1277-1284.
Markowitz, H. (1952): Portfolio selection. Journal of Finance, Vol. 7, S. 77-91.
Modigliani, F., Miller, M.H. (1958): The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of
Investment. American Economic Review, Vol. 48, S. 261-297.
Paese, P. W., Snieszek, J. A. (1991): Influences on the Appropriateness of Confidence in
Judgment: Practice, Effort, Information, and Decision-Making. Organizational Behavior and
Human Decision Processes, Vol. 48, S.100-130.
Rabin, M. (1996): Psychology and Economics. Working Paper, University of California - Berkeley,
September 1996.
Rudolph, B.  (1984): Kreditsicherheiten als Instrumente zur Umverteilung und Begrenzung von
Kreditrisiken. Zeitschrift fuer betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, 36. Jg., S. 16-34.
Russell, T., Thaler, R. (1988): The Relevance of Quasi-Rationality in Competitive Markets, in:
Decision Making: Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Interactions, Bell, D., Raiffa, H.
Tversky, A. (Hrsg.), Cambridge, S. 508-524.
Samuelson, P. (1963): Risk and Uncertainty: A Fallacy of Large Numbers. Scienta, Vol. 98, S.
108-113.
Schiereck, D., Weber, M. (1995): Zyklische und antizyklische Handelsstrategien am deutschen
Aktienmarkt. Zeitschrift für betriebswirtschaftliche Forschung, Vol. 47, 3-24.
Stein, J. (1989): Overreactions in the Options Market. Journal of Finance, Vol. 44, S. 1011-1023.
Stiglitz, J.E., Weiss, A.  (1981): Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American
Economic Review.
Stulz, R.M., Johnson, H. (1985): An Analysis of Secured Debt. Journal of Financial Economics,
Vol. 14, S. 3-27.
Thaler, R. (1986): The Psychology and Economics Conference Handbook: Comments on Simon,
on Einhorn and Hogarth, and on Tversky and Kahneman. Journal of Business, Vol 59, S. 279-
284.
Thaler, R. (1993): Advances in Behavioral Finance, New York.
35
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D.  (1988): Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, in:  Decision
Making: Descriptive, Normative and Prescriptive Interactions, Bell, D., Raiffa, H., Tversky, A.
(Hrsg.), Cambridge, S. 167-192.
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1991): Loss aversion in riskless choice: A reference dependent model.
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 106, S. 1039-1061. 
Tversky, A., Kahneman, D. (1992): Advances in Prospect Theory:  Cumulative Representation of
Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Vol. 5, S. 297-323.
